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committing a crime, and such person, when charged with the commis-
sion of a crime, must rebut such presumption by evidence which reason-
ably satisfies the jury that he was insane at the time the act was com-
mitted.u This is the more logical rule because it places the burden on
the person best fitted to prove it; this rule also follows the general rule
that where affirmative matter is pleaded it must be proven by the
pleader. 2 It would seem that where the state clearly establishes ani
intentional killing by the use of a deadly weapon, an illegal homicide
Is presumed, and if the defense is insanity, the burden of sustaining
it Is upon the person having charge of the defense. %
J3,xss D. ALn=.
RUH'S EXECUTORS v. RUH-ACCELERATION OF THE REMAIN-
DERS BY WIDOW'S REFUSAL TO TAKE UNDER THE WILL.
Testator provided for a trust fund for his grandson, surplus Por.
sonalty and a life estate in all realty to his widow, with remainder over
to his children. The realty was to be sold and the proceeds distributed
among his children upon the death of the widow. Exercising her
statutory right, the widow renounced the will and took a third of the
decedent's real property for life and half of the surplus personalty.
Held, that immediately upon the election of the widow to take against
the will, the remainders to the children were accelerated, and the
remaindermen took as if the contingency, the death of the widow, had
In fact happened. Rnth's Executors v. Ruhz, 270 Ky. 792 (1937).
"Ordinarily the election of the widow to take against the will has
the effect of accelerating any remainder limited to take effect after her
life estate. The election of a widow to take against her husband's will
is equivalent to her death, as respects payment of legacies, and the
distribution of that part of the estate which is to be distributed under
the will upon the happening of that event."' This is the majority rule.'
The Kentucky court has followed the majority on this question, holding
in Trustees v. Morris,' that the general rule is that legacies which were
to be paid at the death of the death of the widow become immediately
due upon the widow's renunciation of the will. It is to be noted that
this rule makes no distinction between contingent and vested remain-
ders. The courts merely hold that the estate is distributable as if the
widow were dead' and let it go at that.
" State v. Corrington ....... Mo ........ 116 S. W. (2d) 87 (1938).
2See 22 C. J. 71, note 66 and cases cited therein.
128 R. C. L., Wills, Sec. 323.
2 Will of Reynolds, 151 Wis. 375, 138 N. W. 1019 (1912); Stevens v.
Stevens, 121 Ohio St. 490, 169 N. E. 570 (1929); Swan v. Austell, 261
Fed. 465 (C. C. A., 5th, 1919); Rose v. Rose, 126 Miss. 114, 88 So. 513
(1929).
' 99 Ky. 317, 36 S. W. 2 (1896).
' e Kerns Estate, 296 Pa. 348, 145 Atl. 824 (1929). See also O'Rear
v. Bogie, 157 Ky. 666, 163 S. W. 1107 (1914) (held that the theory of
acceleration applies to both vested and contingent remainders).
CASE COMMENTS
It would seem that the most important effect of the renunciation
of a will by a widow arises in connection with the acceleration of
remainders. With the general rule as applied to vested remainders
we have no quarrel. However, the theory of election, when applied to
contingent remainders, frequently results in the total disruption of the
testator's plans for the disposition of his estate. It must be taken into
consideration that the electing party has the power in himself or her-
self to alter the disposition of the residue of the estate, and such power
is dangerous. There is a possibility that the electing spouse may be
influenced by those who would be benefited by an immediate vesting
of the contingent remainders.
5 It is entirely possible, for instance, for
a widow to elect to take against a will with which she is entirely
satisfied, merely to insure the vesting of a contingent remainder to a
son and away from other legatees.6
The courts of Massachusetts, though distinctly in the minority,
have announced what we consider to be the sounder rule. This court
holds that a different rule obtains in the case of a vested remainder
from that when it is contingent. In the latter case, the remainder Is
not accelerated by the election of the surviving spouse to take against
the will.7
From the viewpoint of both law and logic, the better way to treat
this problem, in order to reach the sounder conclusion of the minority,
is to consider the death of the surviving spouse as a physical event
upon which the contingency is to be decided. Considered thus, the
election could not have the effect of accelerating the contingent
remainders.
PHEAP SoHIF.
TORTS-CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OF PASSENGER IN
AUTOMOBILE
The deceased and two others were riding with defendant In his
car late at night and as his guests. Defendant complained to the
others of being very sleepy and requested them to stay awake and
talk to keep him from going to sleep. Shortly afterwards all of the
occupants of the car, except the defendant, went to sleep and he was
unable to arouse them. A few minutes later he also fell asleep, the
car ran off the road, and one of the guests was killed. Deceased's ad-
ministratrix brought suit against the driver for damages, alleging
negligence in the driver's operation of the car. The court sustained
the defendant's motion for a directed verdict. Plaintiff appealed.
Held: The deceased was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter
of law. No recovery. Affirmed. Rennolds Admx. v. Waggener, 271
Ky. 300, 111 S. W. (2d) 647, (1937).
Hauk v. McComas, 98 Ind. 460 (1884).
4Disston's Estate, 257 Pa. 537, 101 AtI. 804 (1917).
1 Sawyer v. Freeman, 161 Mass. 543, 37 N. E. 942 (1894). See also
Compton v. Rixey, 124 Va. 548, 98 S. E. 651 (1919).
